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Introduction
Last summer's district court decision in ACL U v. Reno,1 enjoining
enforcement of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,2 was hailed
by the on-line civil liberties community as "a resounding victory for
First Amendment rights everywhere."3 The lead attorney for the
plaintiffs praised the ruling as reflecting "an enormously sophisticated
understanding of the Internet," and predicted that it would "guide all
future courts in deciding a whole variety of issues that apply to the
net."4 A closer examination, however, reveals the court's
"understanding" to be a simplistic view of the distributional
consequences of the Internet that foreshortens the First Amendment
analysis and constrains the Internet's prospects for fulfilling its
democratic promise.
Judge Stewart Dalzell's opinion, which includes what he labels a
"medium-specific" First Amendment analysis,5 is illustrative.
Characterizing the Internet as a "never-ending worldwide
conversation" and "the most participatory form of mass speech yet
developed," Dalzell concluded that the global computer
"deserves the highest protection from
communications network
6
governmental intrusion."
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that the Internet's
unprecedented communicative potential as a cheap, vast, interactive
forum does not, by itself, render governmental regulation of its
content constitutionally suspect. In particular, the structural impact of
the World Wide Web (Web) on the distribution of power in public
discourse may justify intervention by the state. To the extent that the
Web's free market of homepages and links amplifies the voices of the

1. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.),prob.juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
in Title V,
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996 [hereinafter CDA],
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43 (1996)(to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h)).
3. ACLU Lauds Judges' Ruling Protecting Free Speech in Cyberspace, ACLU, Press

Release (last modified June 12, 1996)<http://www.aclu.org/news/n061296a.html>.
4. CDA Rejected in Landmark Ruling, CNET (visited June 13, 1996)<http://cn3.cnet.
com/Content/News/Files/0,16,1541,00.html>.
5. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 872. This Article will argue that the decision, including Judge
Dalzell's opinion, failed to provide an adequate medium-specific First Amendment analysis of

Internet regulation.
6. Id. at 883.
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powerful and silences the powerless, impoverishing public debate,
corrective policy measures should be constitutionally favored.
This Article presents a medium-specific analysis, both theoretical
and empirical, of the structural impact of the Web on public discourse.
Section I provides an introduction to the Web and the related
terminology used throughout this Article. Section II surveys the
doctrinal context for the analysis in this Article. Section III uses a
mathematical model of the Web's link structure relative to groups of
speakers to identify the significant factors affecting the distribution of
communicative power on the Web. Section IV surveys the emerging
structure of public discourse on the Web. Section V proposes
egalitarian policy reforms based on the analysis in this Article, and
assesses their constitutionality. Section VI reviews ACLU v. Reno
from the perspectives elaborated in this Article.
I
The World Wide Web
The Web is a collection of more than 30 million documents stored
in different computers throughout the Internet. These documents may
incorporate any combination of text, graphics, audio, video, computer
programs, and/or any other data that can be stored on digital media. A
user of a networked computer can publish a document on the Web
simply by copying it into a specially designated, publicly accessible
directory on the computer. The document is then immediately
available to anyone on the Internet who knows the address of the
computer and the name of the document.
Thus, an individual or group can establish a presence, or "site,"
on the Web by publishing a set of documents representing the
publisher's viewpoint or providing other information relating to the
publisher. Typically, one of the documents is the "homepage," or the
first access point to the site. The homepage usually provides an
overview of the site and references, or "links," to the other documents
on the site. Additionally, a Web document may also include any
number of links to documents stored anywhere on the Web. Thus,
links can be used as cross-references within a single document,
between documents on the same site, or between documents on
different sites.
By using a special computer program called a "Web browser," a
reader can view, or "browse," any Web document. The reader can
specify a document to browse by typing in its address, selecting it from
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a personal "bookmark file" of frequently used addresses, or following
a link from the document currently being viewed to the document
being referenced. When a document is accessed by a reader, it receives
a "hit." For example, within the span of a few seconds, a reader may
type in the Web address of a political party to retrieve its homepage,
follow one of the links on that homepage to a document listing some
of the political party's allies, and then follow one of those links to the
homepage of an allied organization. Each of these three documents
would be credited with one hit.
A significant consequence of the Web's structure, then, is that
publishers can influence a reader's access to other speakers on the
Internet through their selective inclusion of external links. While it is
true that other forms of speech may include references to other
speakers, the Web is unique in that references, even to speakers
halfway around the world, can be accessed as easily as cross-references
within works by the same author. In a practical sense, linked
documents are truly incorporated by reference as if presented by the
same author.
The set of external links included within a document is part of the
expressive content of that document. The external links also
substantially influence the content received by the reader in
subsequent document accesses. Generally, readers explore, or "surf,"
the Web by following links. Influenced by external links, this process
often leads users to discover subject matter and perspectives unrelated
7
to their original browsing objectives.
For these reasons, a medium-specific analysis of speech on the
Web must examine the distribution of the links among its sites and
speakers. As the next section will suggest, the structure of links on the
Web, while generated through free self-expression, may concentrate
speech power in a manner that contradicts the democratic principles of
the First Amendment.

7. Advertisers on the Web implicitly rely upon this behavior when they pay for placement
of "banner" ads on popular Web pages, thereby obtaining links that curious readers can follow to
their homepages. For a structural model of this "experiential flow" behavior in hypermedia

computer-mediated environments, including the World Wide Web, see Donna Hoffman and
Thomas Novak, Marketing in Hypermedia Computer-Mediated Environments: Conceptual
Foundations,60 J. MARKEnNG 50 (July 1996).
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II
The Doctrinal Context
The Web is only one of many fora where social structure
constrains public discourse, and for which state intervention has been
urged. Madisonian First Amendment scholarship, informed by values
of liberty and by principles of equality, has repeatedly recognized the
inability of the free market to satisfy the nation's constitutional
commitment to robust public debate. The works of Alexander
Meiklejohn,8 Cass Sunstein,9 Owen Fiss, 1° Stephen Gardbaum, 11
Frederick Schauer,12 and Morton Horwitzu offer coherent First
Amendment analyses recognizing the central importance of speech
furthering self-governance.14 In this analysis, the state can and should
regulate public discourse to the extent that the free market constrains
its quality. As Fiss describes, "The state is to act as the much-needed
countervailing power, to counteract the skew of public debate
attributable to the market and thus preserve the essential conditions of
a democracy."'-5
The Madisonian perspective has made a few appearances in the
rapidly expanding literature on First Amendment issues in cyberspace,
but, thus far, it has only sounded tentative cautions against the
excesses of consumer choice. Sunstein writes:
[A] world in which consumers can choose from limitless choices has
many advantages, not least from the Madisonian point of view. If
choices are limitless, people interested in politics can see and listen
to politics; perhaps they can even participate in politics, and in ways
that were impossible just a decade ago. But that world would be far
from perfect. It may increase social balkanization. It may not

8.
(1948).

See, e.g.,

9.
10.
11.
(1993).
12.

See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
See, e.g., OWEN Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996).
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting,Democracy,and the Market, 82 GEo. L.J. 373

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

See Frederick Schauer, The PoliticalIncidence of the Free Speech Principle,64 U. COLO.

L. REV. 935 (1993).
13. See Morton J.Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism,107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109-16 (1993).
14. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 22-28 (1960); Owen Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner,26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 19-

20 (1992).
15.

Fiss, supra note 14, at 6.
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promote deliberation, but foster instead 16a series of referenda in
cyberspace that betray constitutional goals.

Fiss echoes these hopes and fears:
The new technologies . . . may strengthen our democratic
institutions and enable all of us to become better citizens. . . . But
there is another possibility: The new technologies may turn us not
into citizens but consumers, shopping for our favorite speech like we
shop for our favorite ice cream. . . . Cyberspace may be a world
where we listen to what we already agree with and use the channels
of communication simply to signify our approval or disapproval-a
world where individuals express themselves, but1 7 not one in which
they debate and deliberate as democratic citizens.

The Madisonian perspective has not yet fully addressed the Web's
emergence as the leading mode of mass communication in cyberspace.
In the meantime, however, the courts have been leaving no room on
the Internet for the Madisonian view of the First Amendment. In the
past, the Supreme Court allowed content regulation only of electronic
8 and
media that presented structural restrictions on access (Red Lion"
9
Pacifica') or transmission (Turner Broadcasting ). Already though,
several First Amendment cases concerning the Internet have
distinguished Red Lion, Pacifica, and Turner Broadcasting by
21
observing that these scarcity rationales no longer apply.
To make room for Madison in cyberspace-to make the Web safe
for democracy-requires a new, particularized rationale for content
regulation. If democratic deliberation is to be a First Amendment
16. Cass Sunstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace,104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1804 (1995).
17. Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm,104 YALE L.J. 1613, 1617 (1995).
18. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969)(recognizing "the legitimate
claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access" to scarce broadcast
frequencies).
19. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978)oustifying enhanced governmental
regulation of broadcasting, inter alia, because of "scarcity of distribution space, the use of which
the government must therefore license in the public interest").
20. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2465 (1994)(refusing to apply strict scrutiny
to must-carry provisions of 1992 Cable Act where rules were content-neutral in application, cable
operators were not forced to alter their own messages, and cable operators continued to possess
"bottleneck" control over transmission).
21. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2402
(1996)(Souter, J., concurring)(noting technological developments, including Internet and World
Wide Web, make it impractical to "settl[e] upon a definitive level-of-scrutiny rule of review");
Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)("The ease of entry of many speakers sets
interactive computer systems apart from any other more traditional communications medium
that Congress has attempted to regulate in the past."); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877
(E.D. Pa.)(distinguishing Pacificabecause "Internet communication is an abundant and growing
resource"), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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value in cyberspace, concerns about balkanization and concentration
of power must be expressed in medium-specific terms, and preferably
based on structural as well as empirical analysis. As the Supreme
Court has held, "[e]ach medium of expression . ..must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems."
Although the preliminary writings of Sunstein and Fiss do not
provide a basis for egalitarian content regulation on the Web, they
raise appropriate questions for a medium-specific First Amendment
analysis. Does the Web promote or hinder democratic deliberation?
Does the Web balkanize the social order in cyberspace? Do Web sites
engage publishers and readers of opposing viewpoints, or do they
merely provide "what we already agree with?"
A medium-specific analysis would begin by examining the state of
the Web with respect to the structure of public discourse. For
illustration, suppose that there are two perspectives, A and B, with
respect to a particular political issue. Perspective A is held by 40% of
the public and Perspective B is held by 10%, with the remaining 50%
undecided. Each perspective is represented by a number of sites on
the Web, proportional to its level of support in the population.
Suppose that proponents of B believe that their perspective will be
persuasive to anyone who engages in a deliberative comparison
between A and B. Web sites for B therefore include many links to
Web sites for A. On the other hand, proponents of A may believe that
the best way to protect their lead in the polls is to avoid any reference
to B. Because there are many more A sites than B sites on the Web,
publishers of A sites can be confident that their perspective will be
seen by the undecided reader.
As a result of these strategies, Web sites for A actually garner
more than four times as many hits as Web sites for B among exploring
readers. Web sites for A benefit from their opponents' referrals
without returning the favor. As a result, the Web serves to concentrate
speech power in the hands of the majority. This situation is analogous
to the plight of marginalized groups in conventional public discourse:
the minority group, in order to survive, must understand the dominant
perspective sufficiently to deconstruct and criticize it, whereas the
22. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). See also ACLU, 929
F. Supp. at 873 ("[D]ifferential treatment of the mass media has become established First
Amendment doctrine."); Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748 ("We have long recognized that each medium
of expression presents special First Amendment problems.").

HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ.

[VOL. 19:309

mainstream group may benefit unjustly from its ignorance of minority
perspectives.
To the extent that the above scenario is descriptive of the political
landscape in cyberspace, the concerns of Madisonian First
Amendment scholars weigh heavily against Judge Dalzell's sanguine
characterization of the Web's effects on free speech. Drawing on the
postulated terms, the remainder of this Article provides a sobering
reassessment of the Web's effects on the structure of public discourse.
'11
A First Amendment Analysis of the Web
If the courts are to assess the validity of state intervention by
asking "whether the intervention in fact enriches rather than
impoverishes public debate,"' the analysis must be made tractable in
the context defined by the medium. Part of the analytical difficulty of
this structuralist approach to the First Amendment, Fiss notes, is that
"[w]e must be certain everything worth saying is said" without
prejudging "what is worth saying."' To be sure, "there is no such
thing as a false idea";' nonetheless, any equality principle that might
justify content regulation must face the empirical reality that some
ideas simply do not deserve equal time. 6 It is possible, however, to
proceed with the analysis without having globally identified all ideas
worthy of a hearing or all Web documents worthy of hits. By
"proceed[ing] in a negative fashion, trying to identify impermissible
effects ('group disadvantaging,' 'disproportionate impact')," judges
can recognize and analyze forces that distort public discourse, even
"without a commitment to a particular end-state."I
In that spirit, I propose a quantitative model that represents a
reviewing court's inquiry as to whether a given actor enriches or
impoverishes public debate. This model captures the Madisonian
concern with the concentration of speech power without identifying a
priori entitlements to space in the public square. This model is
applicable to any medium with quantitative measures of speech power.
23. Fiss, supra note 10, at 26.
24.
25.

Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).

26. For example, in awarding research grants, the chemistry department of a public
university may legitimately discriminate against proponents of the phlogiston theory. Robert
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 166 (1996).

27. Fiss, supra note 10, at 26.
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Furthermore, I believe it supplies an analytical construct necessary to
weigh the libertarian impulses of Dalzell against the egalitarian
impulses of Sunstein and Fiss with respect to the Web. Specifically, the
model identifies the analytical factors relevant to deciding whether the
Web is a structural impediment to robust public debate.
A.

A Quantitative Model of Rich Public Debate

The proposed model characterizes the public square as a speech
domain comprising several sets of speakers, defined so that each set
possesses an equal entitlement to participate in public debate. Given a
quantitative measure of speech power, we will employ a concentration
index that is based on the standard deviation as the measure of
inequality across the sets?8 An actor that increases the inequality of
the distribution of speech power will be said to impoverish public
debate; an actor that decreases inequality thereby is said to enrich
public debate.
Note that, in the foregoing model, we have not assigned any
semantic or normative interpretations to the sets of speakers. We do
not, for example, assume that Republicans and Democrats deserve
equal time. Nor do we suppose that a group comprising a given
percentage of the populace is entitled to a proportionate share of the
public square; to do so would presume that the group had something
worthwhile to say. The sets are likely to be heterogeneous and will
vary in size. Most significantly, we do not assume any relationship
between the sets and any specific content or viewpoint, so that
regulations based on the structural analysis of inequality will not be
content-based. Indeed, the sets of speakers may not correspond
naturally to any recognizable political or cultural partition of society.'
The point of the model is to quantify changes in the concentration of
speech power across all of society in the context of a particular
medium, not to support the claims of any particular subgroup.
28. Specifically, we use the sum of squares of the shares in the distribution as the measure
of inequality. The two measures are equivalent because the standard deviation of a discrete
probability distribution is linearly related to its root mean square.
29. We have constructed the sets of speakers in this negative manner to ensure that the
ensuing analysis falls within the content-neutral prong of First Amendment doctrine. For a
positive construction of sets with equal speech entitlements, we could invoke the "veil of
ignorance" described in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE passim (1971). A fair division of the
speech "cake" can be achieved by assigning the person who cuts the cake the piece that no one
else chooses. Id. at 85. Thus, an initial assumption that no speaker knows the set to which she will
be assigned would provide the basis for an alternative, but analytically equivalent, formulation of
the model presented here.
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The standard deviation provides a measure of inequality that
takes into account the entire distribution of speech power. Fiss's
equality principle, that the least powerful speakers should receive the
highest level of First Amendment protection a° also aims at minimizing
inequality, but may fail to recognize both opportunities for, and
threats to, robust public debate. For example, the distribution (50, 20,
19, 11) is markedly more unequal-and has a higher standard
deviation-than the distribution (30, 30, 30, 10), but it is not clear from
Fiss's rule that the latter distribution is preferable.
B. A Mathematical Model of the Web
Having formalized a model for measuring the inequality of speech
power across a society, we can analyze the impact of the Web on those
inequalities.
Consider a speech domain Q populated by n > 2 disjoint sets of
speakers S1, 2... ,S,, having equal First Amendment entitlements.
For each i, 1 < i < n, let p, represent the share of the speech domain
1l

occupied by Si, so that 1p=1. We will refer to the vector
i=1

P = (Pl",, ) as the distributionof Q2.
The level of inequality in P can be described by the
'3

concentration index f(P)=

,p2, which

is minimal

when

pI=...=p,.= 1/n, and maximal when Pk =1 for some k. We will refer
to f (P) as the concentrationof P.
For 1:< i < n, 1 < j < n, let xij represent the proportion of links in
web W from pages controlled by Si to pages controlled by Sj. We
will refer to the matrix X = (xej) as the link matrix associated with W.
The level of inequality in X can be described by the
II

concentration index g(X)=

n1

1x , which has a minimum value
i=1 j=1

30. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 107 (arguing that First Amendment values favor allocating
government subsidies to unorthodox "viewpoints and options that otherwise might be slighted or
ignored"); Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781, 788 (1987)("The state must put on
the agenda issues that are systematically ignored and slighted and allow us to hear voices and
viewpoints that would otherwise be silenced or muffled.").
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g(X)=1 when xi=... =x,,= 1 /'n, and a maximum value g(X)=n
when Xkl =1 for some n ordered pairs k, 1.We will refer to g(X) as
the concentrationof X.
Suppose that the distribution of documents being read at some
moment is given by the distribution P; i.e., representative of the
speech domain W. Suppose further that the distribution of links
selected by the readers for the next document is given by the link
matrix X; i.e., representative of the web W. Then, the distribution of
the next documents to be read is given by the vector-matrix product
PX. It follows that the effect of web W on the concentration of
distribution P can be expressed as:
f(PX)= Y
1

j=

,ilJi=1

1

2)

P2

U V

i=l

j]\=1 u*v

=f(Plg(X)- 12)jux -pvxv I
Equation 1

Equation 1 expresses the concentration of the distribution PX as
a difference between two terms. The first term, f(P)g(X), is the
product of the concentrations of P and X, which is at least as great as
the concentration of P. Thus, the effect of the Web will be to increase
the second term,
the
1 n concentration of )2speech power, unless
(PuXvj- pvxuj , is large enough to compensate for the
.

X

j=luv

concentration of X.
For a given j, the inner sum

U-

(PuXvrpvxuj) 2 of this second
v

term can be interpreted as an index representing the degree to which
the distribution of documents referencing sites in set j differs from the
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distribution P. To see this, observe that the two distributions are
identical, i.e., xij=p, for each i, if and only if

_(PuXvj-pyx)2=0.

It follows that there are two structural characteristics of the Web
that are relevant to its effect on the distribution of power in a speech
domain: (1) the concentration of external links from each set of
speakers to other sets of speakers (represented by the factor g(X));
and (2) the extent to which the distribution of links to each set of
speakers differs from the distribution of the speech domain
(represented by the term
1=1 uOV

Thus, the equality principle we have proposed would favor
granting the highest level of First Amendment protection to those
Web sites that (1) provide an equitabledistributionof links to all other
sets of speakers, in accordance with their equal speech entitlements;
and (2) rely upon (i.e., attract links and hits from) an unorthodox
cross-section of Web publishers and readers. Such sites contribute to
robust public debate by presenting a fair number of links to other sets
of speakers, but are the most vulnerable sites on the Web because they
must rely upon a base of support that is contrary to prevailing market
preferences.
Returning to the example given in Section II, we find that the B
sites would be favored under the First Amendment. By publishing
links to their opponents' sites, the B sites seek to provide an equitable
distribution of links. Also, because B sites do not receive any links
from A sites, they must rely upon an unorthodox cross-section of Web
publishers and readers. On the other hand, A sites would not be
favored. By refusing to include links to their opponents, the A sites do
not provide an equitable distribution of links. Further, because A sites
receive links from a proportionate number of B sites as well as A sites,
they benefit from a representative cross-section of Web publishers and
readers.
An obvious remedy for this inequity is to require at least some of
the A sites to provide links to B sites. We will discuss this "must-carry"
proposal in detail in Section V. First, however, we will establish the
case for reform by analyzing the current state of the Web with respect
to the two criteria we have developed in this section.
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IV
The State of the Web
Since its introduction to the public in 1991, the Web has
accompanied the near-exponential growth of the Internet to become a
true mass medium. Today, Web site addresses are commonly used in
advertising, promotions, and corporate identification, and some
600,000 individuals have published personal homepages. 1 An
estimated 11.5 to 18.2 million Americans use the Web, 2 which already
accounts for more traffic on the Internet than any other network
application.' A leading software industry executive speculates that
within the next five years, there will be at least 500 million devices
capable of browsing the Web.34
The economies of the Internet, along with the flexible structure of
Web documents make the Web the most likely trajectory for the longawaited "convergence of communications and media."' Already,
MSNBC, CNET, CBS, CNN, and various radio stations have
demonstrated the robustness of the Web model by "webcasting," or
making some of their transmissions available as real-time audio and/or
video performances within published Web documents.O Many
7
newspapers and magazines also publish electronically via the Web
Web browsers have already incorporated electronic mail facilities into
their services, and will soon allow real-time voice communications as
well) 8 Televisions and telephones capable of browsing the Web will be
available to the public this year.' A scenario in which the Web
31.

John Buten, The First World Wide Web PersonalHome PageSurvey (last modified July

11, 1996)<http://www.asc.upenn.edu/-buten/surveyl.htm>.
32.

Donna L. Hoffman, William D. Kalsbeek & Thomas P. Novak, Internet and Web Use in

the United States: Baselines for Commercial Development (last modified July 9, 1996)
<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu>. This study also reports demographic survey data on Web
users.

33. Donna L. Hoffman, Thomas P. Novak & Patrali Chatterjee,.CommercialScenariosfor
the Web: Opportunitiesand Challenges, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (forthcoming 1997).
34. Joshua Cooper Ramo, Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16,1996, at 63.
35. "Neither producers nor purchasers of audio or video information should find much use,
in the near future, for such terms as 'television,' 'computer,' 'telephone,' or 'radio.' These objects
are no longer distinct devices and we believe that any differences among them are ephemeral."
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1719 (1995).
36. Don't Surf to Us, We'll Surf to You, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1996, at 108.
37. E.g., SLATE (visited Nov. 9, 1996)4ittp://www.slate.com>(weekly Web publication
launched in 1996 by Microsoft Corp., as for-profit enterprise).
38. Richard A. Shaffer, Multimedianet, FORBES, May 22, 1995, at 248.
39. Ramo, supra note 34, at 64.
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swallows all other communications media no longer seems merely
plausible, but probable.
For the foreseeable future, the state of the Web will be subject to
fundamental, continual, and far-reaching change. Every second of the
day, Web documents are published, edited, moved, and deleted, all
without authorization by any governing body or notification to any
central registry. Thus, any empirical description of the Web is literally
obsolete as soon as it is written, and any predictions based on the
current state of the Web must rely heavily on conjecture.
This change and uncertainty does not preclude an investigation of
the Web's present-day features that are relevant to free speech. By
analyzing the state of the Web with respect to First Amendment
criteria, we can assess the extent to which the Web is already
exhibiting anti-democratic properties, identify areas of particular
concern, and suggest corrective action where necessary.
A. Corporate Domination of the Web

As we have already described, two indicators of speech power on
the Web are hits and links. Each hit represents an instance of
communication in which a document is accessed. Thus, the effective
speech power of a Web site may be roughly measured by the
aggregate number of hits received by its documents. Speech power is
also affected by the distribution of links. With other factors equal, a
site that receives many referrals from other sites is more likely to be
visited than a site that receives fewer referrals.
Data on hits and links is collected and published on the Web, but
is not completely reliable. Hits are especially difficult to measure
because many sites do not keep track of accesses, the method of
counting accesses may vary from site to site, and sites may inflate their
access statistics. Link counts are easier to validate, but are less closely
associated with speech power than hit counts.
Despite this imprecision, it is possible to draw two general
conclusions from the available data. First, speech power on the Web is
already largely dominated by corporations, primarily computer
companies and broadcasters. Second, to the extent that speech power
is available to individuals, it is dominated by pornography and content
derived from corporate providers, rather than self-expression and
public discourse.
Presented in Tables 1 and 2 are examples of reliable "Top 25
Sites" lists based respectively on the hits and links criteria. Table 1 lists
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the 25 sites that received the most hits during July 1996, as reported by
the "100hot" Web site. 4° Table 2 lists the 25 sites that were most
frequently linked to by other sites on the Web as of April 14, 1996, as
reported by the "WebCrawler" site.4'
Table 1. Most-Visited World Wide Web Sites, July 1996
Site Owner
1. Netscape
2. NBC
3. CNN

Software
Broadcasting
Broadcasting

4. Yahoo
5. Microsoft
6. AltaVista

Web Directory
Software
Web Search Engine

7. America Online

Internet Provider

8. RealAudio

Software

9. StarWave
10. U.S. Government

Broadcasting
Government

11. Lycos
12. InfoSeek

Web Directory
Web Search Engine

13. Time-Warner
14. Excite
15. WhoWhere?

Broadcasting
Web Search Engine
Web Directory

16. CNN
17. CompuServe

Broadcasting
Internet Provider

18. C-Net
19. Open Text Index
20. Ziff-Davis
21. IBM
22. USA Today
23. Apple Computer

Broadcasting
Web Directory
Software
Software
Print Media
Software

24. McAfee Mall

Software

25. HappyPuppy Games

Software

Type

40. 100hot (visited Nov. 6, 1996)<http://www.100hot.com>. This site appears to provide the
only ranking of hits based on audited data (surveys, log files, and Internet traffic samples).
41. Top 25 Most Linked-to Sites (last modified Apr. 14, 1996) dittp://www.webcrawler.com/
WebCrawler/Top25.html>. This list isbased on approximately 1.6 million Web documents that have
actually been visited by WebCrawler, a small number compared with the 30 million on the Web.
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Table 2. Most-Linked-To World Wide Web Sites, April 1996
Site Owner

Type

1. Netscape

Software

2. Yahoo

Web Search Engine

3. Netscape

Software

4. WebCrawler

Web Directory

5. Lycos

Web Directory

6. Internet Audit Bureau

Web Directory

7. Infoseek Guide

Web Directory

8. Starting Point

Web Directory

9. Microsoft
10. Blue Ribbon Campaign for
Online Free Speech

Software
Political Organization

11. Point

Web Directory

12. White House

Government

13. WWW Consortium

Web Users Group

14. WWW Virtual Library

Web Directory

15. Apple Computer

Software

16. ESPNET SportZone

Broadcasting

17. The Dilbert Zone

Print Media

18. HotWired

Print Media

19. NASA

Government

20. IBM

Software

21. Guide to HTML

Web Users Group

22. AltaVista

Web Search Engine

23. Macmillan

Print Media

24. CNN

Broadcasting

25. TradeWave Galaxy

Web Directory

The "100hot" Web site also provides rankings of the mostaccessed personal home pages on and off college campuses (as
identified by the ".edu" Internet domain).42 Of the top ten college sites
in July 1996, six were image libraries of celebrities and fashion models

42. <http://www.100hot.com>, supra note 40.

19971

MAKING THE WORLD WIDE WEB SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

derived from print and broadcast media.43 All ten of the top offcampus sites were sexually explicit image libraries.'
Two terms of art appearing in Tables 1 and 2, "Web directories"
and "Web search engines," require elaboration. Directories and search
engines are sites that provide referral services for Web users. Web
directories classify other Web sites by subject matter and provide
other summary information relating to each site. Web search engines
allow users to locate textual occurrences of terms within a database of
Web documents. These services allow users to find desired
information on the Web without knowing a specific Web address in
advance. They are typically free and easy to use, and consequently
very popular.
Both directories and search engines gather their data by using
special Web browsing software that traverses every link found on the
Web. This process is so computationally intensive and imposes such
massive storage requirements that general-purpose Web directories
and search engines have been provided only by the for-profit sector. It
is foreseeable that these costs will be recovered. For example,
AltaVista4 5 a leading Web search engine owned by Digital Equipment
Corporation, will ultimately be bundled with browser and other
communications software as a transparent, value-added component.
As the controller of one of the most convenient entry points to the
Web, Digital hopes to create and benefit from an industry standard for
searching, in the same way that Netscape defined the standard for
more general browsing. 6
Notably, comprehensive Web search services effectively provide
links to every document on the Web, thereby satisfying at least the
first of the egalitarian principles outlined in the previous section. In
fact, search engines are an essential component of the policies
proposed in Section V. In view of commercial developments, however,
it is premature to assume that existing Web search services will not
ultimately result in increased corporate control of speech power.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Alta Vista (visited Nov. 26, 1996)<http://www.altavista.digital.com>.
46. Id. The AltaVista home page includes links to information about commercial AltaVistabased software products.
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Balkanization of Political Discourse

Political content occupies a relatively small but vital segment of
the Web. In 1996, political speech on the Web exhibited a rich
diversity of perspectives and formats. Political speakers, however,
tended to discourage public debate by refusing to provide links to
opposing viewpoints. 7
I performed a content analysis of 116 political Web sites' and the
links to and from these sites. The sites were taken from the "Political
Site of the Day Archives"49 for the six-month period from August 1995
47. Although political Web sites may not be representative of the overall content of the
Web, it is appropriate to focus on them because of their transcendental importance to the
freedom of speech. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982)("expression on public issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values."')(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
48. A complete list of the sites: Advocates for Self-Government, AIPolitics, ACLU,
American Political Network, American Prospect, Americans for Tax Reform, Arizona
Presidential Preference Election, Bob Dole for President, Buchanan for President, Budget of the
United States Government, C-SPAN, Campaigns & Elections, Capitol Steps, CARAL, CBS
Campaign '96, Charlotte's Web, Children Now, Christian Coalition, Christian Science Monitor,
Citizens Against Government Waste, Common Sense, Concord Coalition, Congress Action,
Congressional & State Term Limits, Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Congressional
Quarterly's American Voter, Constitution of the United States, Council for a Liveable World,
Covert Action Quarterly, CPAC '96, Daily Muse, Decision 96, Democratic National Committee,
Democratic Socialists of America, Dole Watch, Doonesbury Electronic Town Hall, Dr. John
Hagelin for President, Draft Rush Limbaugh for President, ElectionLine, ElectNet, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, EnviroWeb, Everlasting GOP Stopper, Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Federal Election Commission, Feminist
Majority Foundation, Fidel for President, Fig Bar Man Presidential Campaign, First Amendment
Cyber-Tribune, Flag Burning Page, Foundation for the Advancement of Monetary Education,
Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Freedom Pages, Freedom Writer, Gile's GOP
Infighting Update, Good Government Groups, Green Parties of North America, Harry Browne
for President, Heartland Institute, Heritage Foundation, Independent Candidates, Interfaith
Alliance, Lamar Alexander for President, League of Conservation Voters, Library of Congress,
Log Cabin Republicans, Lugar for President, Majority '96, Million Man March, National Budget
Simulation, National Coalition for the Homeless, National Commission on Economic Growth
and Tax Reform, National Debt Clock, National Issues Convention, National Press Club,
National Rainbow Coalition, National Rifle Association, Netizen, New Hampshire Primary
Home Page, New Party, NewtWatch, OJ Central, Ozone Action, Pat Paulsen for President, Pete
Wilson Exposed, Politics USA, President '96, Project Vote Smart, Punch Rush Limbaugh,
Reinventing America, Republican Mock Convention, Right on the Web, Rock the Vote, Ronald
Reagan Home Page, Senator Arlen Specter for President, Separation of School & State Alliance,
Skeleton Closet, State of the Union, THOMAS: Legislative Information on the Internet, Town
Hall, Tripod's Political Playbook, Ultimate Pro-Life Resource List, United Nations, United We
Stand America, Utne Lens, Voters Telecommunications Watch, We're Right-They're Wrong,
Web Active, Welfare and Families, What I Think, White House, Whitewater Scandal Home
Page, WomensNet, Written Word, Yahoo Politics Summary.
49. The "Political Site of the Day" is a Web site produced by Internet Publishing. This site
seeks to advertise other sites that are "entertaining, informative, and/or relevant to the current
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to February 1996, and were visited during the week of July 15-19,
1996.50 The results of this analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3. Prevalence of Links Between Political Web Sites,
By Political Orientation, July 1996
Political

Links to

Orientation

Opposition

Total Sites

Links from

Referring

Opposition

Sites

-

37

-

51

Democratic

2

13

6

20

Republican

0

19

3

20

Libertarian
Progressive

1
3

13
12

4
1

16
11

Other

6

22

3

23

Nonpartisan

This data presents a bleak vision of democratic discourse on the
Web. As Table 3 shows, only a small minority of partisan sites (12 of
79, or 15%) offered links to opposing viewpoints. Moreover, even in
this small sample, the majority-minority power dynamics described
throughout this Article are noticeable. Taken in aggregate, the sites
offering mainstream perspectives-Democrats, Republicans, and
Libertarians-provided less diversity than they received in referrals.
On the other hand, the Progressive and "Other" Web sites offered
more links to opposing views than they received in return. Table 4
shows that these patterns were also common to various categories
based on site content.

political discourse," without respect to ideology. Political Web Traveler (visited July 19, 1996)
<http://www.intpub.comlsiteoftheday.html>. The archives of this site appear to provide the best
available representative data set of political speech on the Web.
50. Mindful of the inherent difficulty of content analysis, I have taken care to avoid the now

famous methodological errors that plagued an earlier analysis of online content. See Marty
Rimm, Marketing Pornographyon the Information Superhighway, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995). In

particular, I have provided a specification of the data set that is sufficient to validate my results.
Prior to publication in the Georgetown Law Journal, Rimm's study was reported in an influential
Time magazine cover story. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You, TIME, July 3, 1995, at
38. For a detailed critique of the study, see Donna Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed
Analysis of the Conceptual, Logical, and Methodological Flaws in the Article "Marketing

Pornographyon the Information Superhighway" (1996)<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/
rimm.cgi >.
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Table 4. Prevalence of Links Between Political Web Sites,

By Content Type, July 1996
Links to
Total Sites

51

Links from

Referring

Opposition

Sites 52

Type of Site

Opposition

Directory

3

8

3

17

News

0

2

1

6

Commentary

6

25

5

21

Humor

0

2

0

2

Party
Homepage

1

5

5

29

Candidate
Homepage

0

11

1

16

Group
Homepage

2

26

6

31

These observations challenge the premise that the Web's
contribution to free speech can be measured solely in terms of the
number and diversity of its speakers. Far from fostering deliberative
political discourse, most of the surveyed Web sites sought to
consolidate speech power and served to balkanize the public forum.
C.

Concentration of Media Power

The corporate domination of the Web and the balkanization of
social discourse have arisen in an era of increasing concentration in
the media and telecommunications industries. 53 Some business
analysts predict that mergers and acquisitions in these fields will
continue until as few as six to ten global conglomerates control these
markets.54
The Telecommunications Act of 19965 cleared the way for much
broader cross-ownership of local and long-distance telephone services,
51. Excluding nonpartisan sites.
52. Excluding nonpartisan sites.
53. Another related industry, the market for Web browser software, has also become highly
concentrated, with Netscape and Microsoft engaged in an "epic battle" for the Internet. Ramo,
supra note 34, at 56. Concentration in the Web browser market may also serve to concentrate
speech power, because popular browsers, including Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Explorer,
provide built-in links to the corporate sites of their software companies. Cf. Table 1, supra
(ranking Netscape and Microsoft among top five sites by hits).
54. Alexander Stille, Media Moguls, United, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1995, at A13, A15.
55. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56(1996).
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and broadcast and cable television. While this deregulation was
intended to encourage the efficient convergence of communication
technologies,5 it is also likely to accelerate the concentration of media
power.
As the prevalence of personal Web sites devoted to celebrities
and fashion models 57 illustrates, corporate domination of the media
extends itself into the Web. As Robert McChesney points out, it is
likely that the undemocratic hierarchies of speech power in the
traditional media will ultimately be reproduced in cyberspace:
Aside from the question of access, bulletin boards, and the
information highway in general, do not have the power to produce a
political culture where it does not exist in society at large. Given the
dominant patterns of global capitalism, it is far more likely that the
Internet and the new technologies will adapt themselves to the
existing political culture rather than create a new one. Thus, it seems
unlikely that the Internet will necessarily politicize people; it may
just as well keep them depoliticized. 58
V
Free Speech Policies for the Web
I have identified four policy initiatives that would significantly
improve the prospects for democratic discourse on the Web. They are
described below, listed in increasing order of ambition and scope.
A. Free Public Search Engines and Directories

As a first step toward ensuring a fair distribution of links to all
Web sites, the federal government should provide comprehensive
search engines and directories that are free to the public. These
services would benefit Web publishers by providing starting points on
the Web from which all other sites would be equally accessible. The
search engines and directories would also allow users an opportunity
to access and explore the Web without being inundated by corporate
advertisements and promotions.

56. The purpose of the Act is "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
to encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Id. at § 202, 110
Stat. at 133.
57. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
58. Robert W. McChesney, The Internet and U.S. Communication Policy-Making in
Historicaland CriticalPerspective, 46 J. COMM. 1 (1996).
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Free public search services are consistent with longstanding
government policies favoring universal access to information. Just as
postal subsidies have made newspapers more available and free public
libraries have made books more available, the government has an
important role in making Web pages more available.
B.

Free Public Link Exchanges

The federal government should also provide a service that allows
Web publishers to exchange links with each other on a site-for-site
basis. To participate, a publisher would reserve a space on her home
page for a "guest" link, and then inform the link exchange that she had
taken this action. In return, her page would be advertised on other
sites, which would change at specified time intervals. Because all
participating sites would appear in the same rotation, the link
exchange would have the democratically favored effect of providing
the most references to the sites receiving the fewest hits. Even so, all
participating sites would benefit to some degree from the exchange.
The Internet Link Exchange ("ILE"), 59 a for-profit service,
highlights the distinctive features of the proposed exchange and the
need for governmental intervention. Links on the ILE are exchanged
on a "two hits-for-one hit" basis, so that the least-read sites derive the
least benefit from the program. The ILE takes half of the hits as
overhead, using them for commercial advertising.' The ILE's
structure thus reflects and amplifies the anti-democratic rationality of
the marketplace.
C. Must-Carry Regulations
To counteract the structural forces tending to concentrate speech
power on the Web,61 Congress should take the further step of
establishing must-carry rules governing the most popular sites. For
example, sites receiving more than 1,000 hits a week could be required
to carry at least five links to sites participating in the free public link
exchange.
The exact parameters of such a policy will require a more
comprehensive and precise review of the state of the Web than has
been presented here. In any case, however, the statistics in Section IV
and the structural analysis in Section III demonstrate the need for
59. ILE (visited Feb. 25, 1997)<http://www.linkexchange.com>.
60. Id.
61. See supra Section I.
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substantial redistribution of speech power if the Web is to fulfill its
democratic promise. As Edwin Baker suggests, "[t]he aim [in media
regulation] should be structure that promotes creative opportunities
and facilitates audience access to diverse cultural, partisan, and
informational communication."'
A must-carry rule for the Web, 3 based solely on the level of
traffic at a site and not on any attributes of its publisher or its content,
is a content-neutral regulation. 4 This regulation compares favorably
with the Federal Communications Commission rules that were
analyzed in the Supreme Court's first review of the Turner
Broadcasting65 case. It should also be found constitutional under the
O'Brien' test for content-neutral speech regulation. In O'Brien, the
Supreme Court held that a content-neutral regulation passes First
Amendment scrutiny if "it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest." 67
In Turner Broadcasting,the Court held that "assuring the public
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First
Amendment."'6 Accordingly, provisions of the Cable Act of 1992
requiring cable television systems to reserve a fraction of their
channels for local broadcast television stations would be found to
62.

C. Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, 17 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 97, 123 (1994).

63. The government's authority to regulate the Web comes from the fact that the Internet is
partially supported by federal funds. See Testimony of Dr. Melvyn Ciment, Federal Document
Clearing House Congressional Testimony, May 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library,
CNGTST File. The fact that the Web is a global forum and the Internet is a transnational
architecture does not prevent individual nations from regulating publishers and users within their
borders. See generally Amy Knoll, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet,4
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275 (1996)(reviewing national regulation of Internet).

64. The Supreme Court has long recognized the enhancement of diversity as a contentneutral justification for speech regulation. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978). But see Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct.
2445, 2477 (1994)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(arguing that mustcarry rules are content-based because they include an explicit preference, inter alia, "for diversity
of viewpoints").
65.

Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (1994).

66. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
67. Id. at 377.
68. Turner Broad., 114 S.Ct. at 2470 (plurality opinion).
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serve an important governmental interest if the government could
show that "1) unless cable operators are compelled to carry broadcast
stations, significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused
carriage on cable systems; and 2) that the broadcast stations denied
carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail
69
altogether."
The proposed must-carry rule for the Web would impose an
analogous regulation on sites having significant power in a
concentrated speech market. Our analysis strongly suggests that this
regulation, as applied to the Web, would satisfy both of the required
showings. First, our survey of political Web sites in Section IV
indicated that significant numbers of less powerful sites are denied
links from more powerful sites. Second, our structural analysis in
Section III demonstrated that the absence of such links further
concentrates speech power on the Web, so that the less powerful sites
measurably "deteriorate to a substantial degree."
With respect to narrow tailoring, the Court in Turner
Broadcastingheld that "a regulation need not be the least speechrestrictive means of advancing the government's interest."' Rather,
the regulation should not "burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."' Thus, on
remand, the FCC regulations would be found to be narrowly tailored
if the burdens on cable operators and cable programmers were not
substantially greater than necessary. Such burdens would include:
the extent to which cable operators will, in fact, be forced to make
changes in their current or anticipated programming selections; the
degree to which cable programmers will be dropped from cable
systems to make room for local broadcasters; and the extent to
which cable operators can satisfy their must-carry obligations by
devoting previously
unused channel capacity to the carriage of local
72
broadcasters.
None of these burdens is seriously at issue under the proposed
Web regulations. Web documents can be any size, subject only to the
constraints of disk space on the host computer. Thus, adding links to a
document does not displace any of its content. A Web document can
easily be augmented with five links using less than one kilobyte of disk
space. It is inconceivable that a site attracting more than 1,000 hits a
69. Id. at 2472.
70. Id. at 2469.
71.
72.

Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
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week would be located on a host machine that did not have sufficient
available disk space to accommodate the must-carry links.
Similarly, the proposed Web regulations would also be unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. A must-carry rule would
augment speech, not displace it. Like the FCC provisions, the Web
regulations would be "broad-based" and, therefore, would not be
"structured in a manner that carries the inherent risk of undermining
First Amendment interests."' Therefore, it is safe to conclude that a
must-carry rule for the Web would survive First Amendment scrutiny
under Turner Broadcastingand O'Brien.
The Court in Turner Broadcastingdid not focus solely, or even
primarily, on the number of existing broadcast television stations.
Instead, it recognized that the market power of cable television
systems created medium-specific issues that required a more
sophisticated First Amendment analysis.74 Similarly, courts should
recognize that the structure of the Web presents special First
Amendment problems that are not properly addressed solely by
assertions about the ease, popularity, and diversity of Web publishing.
As this Article has demonstrated and as Eugene Volokh has observed,
"a greater diversity of available speech need not lead to the
diversification of what is actually consumed." 75
D. Content-Based Regulation
The focus on content neutrality in First Amendment
jurisprudence presents a formidable obstacle for content-based
regulation of any speech medium. To survive strict scrutiny, any
content restriction in a public forum must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.76 For example, prohibitions
against pornography have been found invalid for overbreadth to the
extent that the definition of "pornography" differs from that of
"obscenity" and includes protected speech.77
73. Id. at 2468.
74. Id. ("The must-carry provisions ... are justified by special characteristics of the cable
medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators and the dangers this
power poses to the viability of broadcast television. . . . It should come as no surprise, then,
that Congress decided to impose the must-carry obligations upon cable operators only.").
75. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
77. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985). See also
ACLU v. Reno, 824 F. Supp. 824,849 (E.D. Pa.)(finding reasonable probability Communications
Decency Act might be found unconstitutional on its face to extent that it reached indecency),
prob. juris.noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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An alternative First Amendment doctrine, based on Madisonian
principles, would recognize that "[t]he state might . . . have the right

to stop the general advocacy of an idea when that advocacy has the
effect of interfering with the speech rights of others. 78 In applying this
doctrine to a restriction on pornography, a court would weigh the
silencing effect of pornography on women' against the speech value
of the prohibited materials. Such an analysis would probably support
broader regulations on speech protection than what would withstand
strict scrutiny under current law. In particular, given the prevalence of
pornography on the Web8° and the vast gender disparity among Web
authors,81 the silencing effect of pornography on women may be more
easily documented on the Web than in traditional fora, thus justifying
specific governmental intervention.
VI
ACLU v. Reno Revisited
Even without supposing a Madisonian transformation of First
Amendment doctrine as described above,' it is possible to criticize
ACLU v. Reno on its own terms. Under current free speech doctrine,
the court correctly ruled that the challenged provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) 3 were
unconstitutionally overbroad.84 Despite the best efforts of Judge
Dalzell, however, the district court failed to provide a medium-specific
First Amendment analysis of Internet regulation.8
The CDA was signed into law on February 8, 1996. Comprising
Title V of the Telecommunications Act, the CDA contains provisions
making it a crime to make "indecent" or "patently offensive"
78.

Fiss, supra note 10, at 84.

79. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 193 (1987)("We are stripped of authority and reduced and
devalidated and silenced.").
80. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. In March 1996, an estimated 14% of personal Web page authors were women. Buten,
supra note 31.
82. Other doctrinal developments are possible. See, e.g., Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and
the FirstAmendment: A Call for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 131-38

(1996)(arguing that geography-independent, tort-based standard for obscenity is more
appropriate in cyberspace).
83.

CDA, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(a), 110 Stat. 56, 133-43 (1996).

84. See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(finding section 223(d),
(e)(5)(A) of CDA unconstitutionally overbroad and facially invalid).
85. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.),prob.juris.noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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materials available to minors over the Internet. 86 On the same day, the
ACLU and 20 other organizations filed actions in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania for a temporary restraining order to enjoin
enforcement of two provisions of the CDA.87 Soon thereafter, the
American Library Association and 26 other organizations filed a
similar action. 8 The actions were consolidated and heard by a threejudge court consisting of Chief Judge Dolores Sloviter of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Judges of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Ronald Buckwalter and Stewart
Dalzell. 89 After extensive stipulations of fact, hearings, and oral
arguments,' the court granted the preliminary injunction. The court
unanimously found both of the challenged provisions facially
unconstitutional,' but issued three separate opinions with differing
analyses.
Judge Sloviter held that although "there is certainly a compelling
government interest to shield a substantial number of minors from

86. Section 502 of the CDA amends 47 U.S.C. section 223(a)(1)(B) and section 223(d) to
provide:
(a) whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of
age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the
call or initiated the communication;
(d) whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
(A) uses an interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18 United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
87. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
88. Id. at 827-28.
89. Id. at 828.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 849.
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some" sexually explicit online materials, 92 the CDA is overbroad to
the extent that it covers some protected speech. 93 Because the CDA is
content-based, Sloviter noted that it is presumptively invalid unless it
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.94 From
the findings of fact, she found that "it is either technologically
impossible or economically prohibitive for many of the plaintiffs to
comply with the CDA without seriously impeding their posting of
online material which adults have a constitutional right to access."9I
Judge Buckwalter's analysis focused on Fifth Amendment due
process considerations. He emphasized that "[i]t is a basic principle of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined."' Noting that the word "indecent" in the
CDA "is an undefined word which, standing alone, offers no
concluded
guidelines whatsoever as to its parameters," 97 Buckwalter
98
that the provisions were unconstitutionally vague.
Judge Dalzell's opinion, the longest and most eloquent of the
three and the only one claiming to take a "medium-specific
approach," ' relied heavily on the "very low barriers to entry" for
communication on the Internet." "[A]s a result of these low barriers,"
he wrote, "astoundingly diverse content is available on the
Internet . . . . [T]he Internet provides significant access to all who
wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among
speakers."' 1 Dalzell went on to argue that the costs of compliance
with the CDA,'1 by raising the barriers to entry, would diminish the
diversity of content and "skew the relative parity among
speakers . . . on the Internet."1"

As "the most participatory

marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed the world92. Id. at 853.
93. Id. at 854.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 860 (quoting Grayned v.City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
97.

Id. at 861.

98.

Id. at 858. But see Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(rejecting

plaintiff's claim that section 223(d) of CDA is void for vagueness).
99. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873.

100. Id. at 877.
101. Id.
102.

"Such costs include those attributable to age or credit card verification (if possible),

tagging [to identify adult-only material] (if tagging is even a defense under the Act), and
monitoring or review of one's content." Id. at 878.
103. Id.
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has yet seen," Dalzell concluded, "the Internet deserves the broadest
possible protection from government-imposed, content-based
regulation."' 104 Applying strict scrutiny, he accepted the government's
interest in protecting children from pornography, 105 but found the
CDA overbroad to the extent that it covered protected speech. 10
Of the three opinions, Dalzell's opinion is the most troubling
from the Madisonian perspective. Sloviter's and Buckwalter's opinions
simply apply the established First Amendment: overbreadth doctrine
to a content-based speech regulation, as they would in any medium.
While their analyses do not take into account the interests of those
silenced by indecent speech, their failure to do so is the necessary
consequence of a jurisprudence centered on content neutrality.
On the other hand, Dalzell attempts to fix new standards for
content regulation of the Internet. In conferring "the broadest possible
protection" upon the new medium, he prejudges the distributional
consequences of the Internet 1' and thus minimizes the prospects for
egalitarian reform. In particular, Dalzell would probably reject the
must-carry rule proposed in Section V.C under strict strutiny.108 This
"medium-specific" approach may make Dalzell's opinion a favorite
among commentators,"° but it is also a serious threat to the
Madisonian aspirations of the Web.
VII
Conclusion
The Web is a vast speech domain that may ultimately swallow all
telecommunications media currently in use. Because of its potential
scope, the Web presents important opportunities for First
104.

Id. at 881.

105. Id. at 882.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 104. Dalzell also objects that "[a]fter the
CDA, . . . the content of a user's speech will determine the extent of participation in the new
medium." Id. at 877. He thus fails to recognize that this condition is true even without the CDA.
108. In giving "the broadest possible protection" to the Internet, Dalzell would probably
reject the intermediate scrutiny standard applied in Turner Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994), even for a content-neutral regulation. Thus, it is doubtful that the must-carry rules
proposed in Section V.C of this Article would survive Dalzell's First Amendment scrutiny.
Dalzell cites Turner Broadcastingonly to support differential First Amendment treatment of
various communications media: for example, that FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,438 U.S. 726
(1978), is narrowly limited to broadcast media. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873.
109. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 1996, at 6
(describing Dalzell's opinion as best of the three).
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Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the convergence of media
technologies will enable the courts to discard the distinct "broadcast
model" of free speech law and return to more well-established First
Amendment principles. 110
An even more exciting prospect is that the Web, because of its
vastness, may accommodate the frequently incompatible interests of
liberty and equality. The must-carry rule proposed in this Article is an
example of a policy that would enhance public debate and expand the
diversity of public discourse without sacrificing individual expressive
rights. However, given the shape of things to come, it is still much too
early for the government to abandon its role in making the Web safe
for democracy.

110. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 35, at 1720. These principles include free
expression, access, and diversity. Id. at 1727-31.

